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Penny auction is an innovative and blooming online auction in which bidders are charged 
a small fee for placing each bid. A penny auction typically ends up with an extremely low 
final auction price. Therefore, in each auction, only one bidder can enjoy positive surplus 
whereas other bidders suffer from bidding costs incurred.  
In this thesis we firstly provide detail introduction to penny auction as well as its specific 
features. We then target at solving the bidder retention issue in penny auction which is 
caused by a skewed distribution of bidder surplus. Specifically, we manage to identify a 
small group of aggressive bidders who are dominating occasional bidders and win most 
of the items in penny auction. We design three restrictions on bidding activities on all 
customers with the intention to limit aggressive bidders’ behaviors and adjust the skewed 
surplus distribution. Then we empirically investigate the dynamics of consumer surplus 
and bidding behaviors by conducting a field experiment. At a macro level analysis we 
apply Gini coefficient and the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) metrics to measure the 
equality of surplus distribution. At a micro level analysis, bidder’s participation and 
bidding behaviors (like number of auctions participated and number of bids placed) are 
analyzed using multiple econometric models. 
At first sight, these restrictions may hurt the auction provider’s profitability. However, 
our results show these restrictions could enhance overall customer retention rate. The 
intuition is to restrict the winning probability of a small group of bidders who won most 
of the auctions so that more bidders can enjoy the thrill and fun of winning an auction, 
inducing them to bid more at the target website in the long run. 
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Though traditional online auction formats like eBay auctions have been widely applied 
for a long period of time, there are more and more innovative online auction formats 
emerging that attract both practitioners and scholars’ attentions. Among these innovations 
penny auction is a typical one that is still understudied by IS scholars. 
Online penny auction sites are becoming more and more popular due to their ability to 
provide huge bargains (e.g., it is not uncommon to get discounts of up to 95% off the 
manufacturer-suggested retail price of auctioned goods). Traffic analysis
1
 shows that 
quibids.com, one of the leading penny auction websites in the US, has attracted more 
than 4 million unique visitors within a month, and the four leading penny auction 
websites
2
 worldwide combined have already had 11% as many unique visitors as eBay in 
March 2011. 
Penny auction applies a Pay-to-Bid mechanism (Platt et al., 2010) and is considered as a 
special form of all-pay auction. Specifically, bidders will be charged each time they place 
a bid in penny auctions, while they do not need to pay for bidding in a traditional online 
auction such as eBay. In addition to such bidding fee, a penny auction differs in how the 
auction price is determined. A penny auction typically starts from a zero price and 
increases by a constant but small amount, such as USD$0.1, each time a bid is placed. In 
reality, the auction winner often gets the auctioned item at a very low price. For instance, 
                                                             
1  Analysis from Compete.com in March 2011. 
2 These four websites are swoopo.com, beezid.com, quibids.com and bidcactus.com, respectively. 




in penny auctions, an iPhone 4 with retail price USD$700 can be sold for as low as 
USD$150. With deeply discounted final prices, penny auctions have successfully 
attracted the many eyeballs of online bidders, as is reported in previous studies like 
Augenblick (2009). Penny auction websites can collect revenues from both the product 
sales and the bidding fees from all participating bidders. For example, many websites set 
the increment of auction prices at $0.01 and therefore $150 implies 15,000 bids. If the 
cost of each bid is USD$0.1, the penny auction can earn $1,500 from the bidding fees, 
which is sufficient to cover their loss in selling an iPhone 4 at $150. This example 
illustrates the reality that penny auction sites may make profits from the bidding fees 
alone. 
The penny auction format and its extremely low final auction price is a double-edged 
sword. On one hand, low auction prices attract bidders to participate in this type of 
auctions. On the other hand, in each penny auction, there can be only one winner who 
potentially earns very high surplus whereas all losing bidders suffer some loss in having 
incurred the bidding fees. In contrast, in conventional eBay auctions, no bidder ever 
suffers monetary loss even if they fail to win the auction. For example, in our iPhone 
example, a penny auction winner can gain as high as $700-$150-$0.1 of surplus if he 
wins the item with only one bid whereas all other bidders’ expenditure of $1500 bears no 
returns for them. If there are some experienced or intelligent bidders exist who can win 
most of the items, most of the other bidders will suffer. If a novice bidder participates in 
several penny auctions but he cannot win any auctions in the short run, it is natural to 
conjecture that he may accumulate significant losses in bidding fees, become 
disenfranchised with this auction site, and thus exit from the penny auction site altogether. 




Over the long run, as the number of bidder decreases, the participants in each auction 
may decrease, and the penny auction website’s profit may deteriorate sharply. Therefore, 
managing the retention of customers in penny auctions is an instrumental part of 
achieving profits in such sites. 
Motivated by this issue, we conducted a real-world field experiment with a leading penny 
auction provider in Asia. Before September 23
rd
, 2010, the auction site operators 
observed few bidders winning most of the auctions and they started to receive complaints 
from customers who incurred high bidding charges but could not win any auction items. 
Working with the site operator, we implemented 3 rules to equalize bidders’ surplus in 
auctions, with the intention to curb a small group of bidders’ aggressive bidding 
strategies and to rebalance the winning probability of auctions among a larger pool of 
customers. The 3 rules implemented are as follows: (1) each bidder is allowed to win a 
maximum of 8 auctions within 28 days; (2) each bidder cannot win the same item more 
than once within 28 days; (3) each bidder is allowed to participate in only X concurrent 
auctions where X is 8 minus the number of auctions won in the past 28 days. Although 
focusing on different dimensions, these 3 rules share the same purpose of reducing the 
auction participation capacity of those frequent, aggressive bidders, such that the 
opportunities of winning auctions are not concentrated among these bidders. 
In this thesis, we firstly give detailed introduction to online penny auction, focusing on 
the specific its features such as bidding fee, bidding increment, auto-bidding agents and 
extendable countdown timer. Varying these settings provide diverse implementations of 
penny auction. For example, normal auctions have a bidding increment of 15 cents, while 
five cent auctions increase item price by only 5 cents each time. Free auctions, compared 




with normal auctions, don’t have bidding fees incurred. Then we conduct detailed 
comparisons of these features with eBay auctions.  
The main objective of this thesis is to empirically analyze how these three rules may 
impact bidders’ retention and participation in auctions. Specifically, we answer the 
following research questions:  
Does the implementation of bidding restriction rules in penny auctions 
(1) Contribute to a more equalized distribution of bidders’ surplus across an auction 
market? 
(2) Increase the probability of a unique bidder to bid at least once in each subsequent 
week? 
(3) Increase the average number of auctions and the number of bids by a unique bidder in 
each subsequent week? 
The contributions of this research lie in clarifying the answers to the above three research 
questions which have not been studied before in the context of penny auctions. Answers 
to these questions will help to quantify precisely the individual bidder level and aggregate 
market level impacts of the bidding restriction rules implementation. These will help the 
penny auction industry to address and manage the crucial issue of bidder attrition and 
customer retention in the long run, in order to maximize customer lifetime values (Ho, et 
al. 2006).  
Our analysis results show that a skewed or lopsided consumer surplus distribution is 
highly correlated to more bidder attrition on our penny auction website. The 
implementation of the bidding restriction rules improves the surplus distribution in a 




more equal manner such that the Gini coefficients for consumer surplus drop significantly 
by 10% after the rule changes. In addition, we find evidence that the customer retention 
rate of marginal, occasional bidders are higher after the rule changes, and that they 
increased the number of auction participations and the number of bids placed in auctions. 
These benefits for the marginal occasional bidders, however, are offset by the loss or 
reduction in the auction bidding and participation activities by the aggressive, frequent 
bidders. 
To further verify our results, we conducted another analysis of bidder’s surplus using 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) metrics, which provides the capability of accounting for 
heterogeneous individuals with respect to their surplus level. Using Probit models, we 
successfully identify the poverty line of 13.5 SGD. That is, bidders with weekly surplus 
larger than 13.5 SGD are counted as the “rich” among all bidders; and bidders who have 
weekly surplus smaller than 13.5 SGD are at a state of “poverty” in our context. Utilizing 
this poverty cutoff, we manage to observe that, with the 3 rules, the majority of bidders 
who are not “rich” have increasing participation probabilities, and the minority “rich” 
bidders are less likely to join in penny auctions. This provides consistent results as the 
previous models. Besides, we explored the potential cause of the skewed surplus 
distribution in penny auction. It is verified that there exist addiction behaviors among 
penny auction bidders, where we define addiction in penny auction as a positive 
correlation between a bidder’s previous amount of bids and his current amount of bids. It 
is argued that such behaviors may induce the aggressive bidding behaviors in the context 
of penny auctions.  




Our research findings in this study imply that rather than emphasizing on the total amount 
of customer surplus at the aggregate level, penny auction operators should not ignore the 
distribution of consumer surplus, which may ultimately impact on customer satisfaction 
levels. The three bidding restriction rules designed provide a convenient and economical 
way to potentially equalize the distribution of consumer surplus in penny auctions. 
Therefore, with this systematic analysis of the three bidding rules, we are able to offer the 
industry an effective and efficient solution to maximize customer retention rates and 
lifetime values in penny auctions. 
The rest of the thesis is as follows. In the second chapter, we provide an introduction to 
penny auction and related literature reviews. Chapter 3 describes the dataset used in this 
study. Chapter 4 contains research method that covers research design, data definition 
and research models. Analysis and findings are provided in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 we 
provide discussions and implications, and finally conclusions are drawn in Chapter 7. 




2. Background and Literature Review 
2.1. Penny Auction and Its Features 
The process of a typical penny auction is as follows. The penny auction website launches 
a new auction by specifying the item to sell and the auction starting time. Bidders can bid 
anytime as long as the auction does not end. Each time they place a bid, one token will be 
consumed from their accounts and the item price will be increased by the amount of pre-
determined bidding increment. If there are several bidders bidding simultaneously, the 
price increment will be multiplied by the number of simultaneous bids. Instead of bidding 
individually, bidders can also use auto-bidding agents to bid for them, by specifying a 
price interval and the number of bids that the bidder wants to place in this price interval. 
When item price reaches the price interval the auto-bidding agents will be activated and 
automatically place a bid or bids for the bidders. The countdown timer will be reset to (or 
increased by, depended on specific setting) 20 seconds each time there’s a new bid. Only 
when no other bidders are willing to place bids can the auction ends. Finally, when a 
penny auction ends the last bidder becomes the winner and needs to pay for the item at 
the final item price. This process is shown graphically in Figure 2-1. 





Figure 2-1 : Process of a Typical Penny Auction 
 
2.1.1. Bidding Fee 
The most significant feature of penny auction comes from its non-zero bidding fee. 
Compared to normal online auctions like eBay, in penny auction each time a bidder 
places a bid he will be charged one token that usually costs 75 cents. As such bidding fee 
is just a small amount of money, it is affordable for most bidders to place multiple or 
even many bids in an auction. Because the penny auction winner can always get the item 
with a deep-discounted price, the small amount of bidding fee is then offset by the large 
surplus derived from the auction. This is why though bidders need to pay for each of the 
bids they still keep pouring into penny auctions. 
However, such a bidding fee does not guarantee the bidder can win the auction and get 
the item; in fact, even if a bidder spends a lot amount on bidding fees, he may still lose 
the auction. This occurs when other bidders have sufficient tokens and willingness to 




play, or when the bidder does not place a bid in time before the countdown timer ends. 
Thus the bidding fee is merely a “ticket” for him to participate in penny auction. 
From penny auctioneer’s perspective, bidding fee constitutes the majority of the profits. 
Though it is just a small amount of money, it may still become considerably large when 
there are a lot of bids. In penny auction, the final item price is usually very low. For 
example, a USD$700 iPhone 4 may be sold at only a few hundred dollars. The gap 
between such low item price and the product cost is filled by bidding fees. In reality the 
bidding fee is designed subtly multiple times larger than bidding increment, this consists 
of the source of profit for penny auctioneers. If a bid costs 75 cents (i.e. the bidding fee) 
and increases the item price by 15 cents (i.e. the bidding increment), each bid contributes 
60 cents revenue (i.e 75 – 15 = 50 cents) to the auctioneer. In this way N bids bring 60*N 
cents’ revenues. As long as the cumulative number of bids is large enough so that 60*N 
is sufficient to cover the item cost, then the auctioneer can make profit. Take the previous 
iPhone 4 as an example, if there are 1167 bids (i.e. 700/0.6) then the auctioneer has 
already break even in this auction. 1167 bids make the item price only to 175.05 dollars, 
and it can foresee that bidders will still be attracted by such a low item price and continue 
bidding. In this way the bidding fee contributes to the auctioneer’s profit. 
Bidding fee is linked with tokens because token is the way that bidding fee is charged. 
Before a bidder participates in penny auction he will have to purchase a number of 
tokens. Token cost is equal to the bidding fee, and each time a bidder places a bid one 
token will be deducted from his account. 
Penny auctioneers may vary the amount of bidding fee. BidCactus.com imposes a 
bidding fee of 75 cents and Quibids.com charges 60 cents for a bid, while beezid.com 




offers several bid packages where the bidding fee ranges from 55 cents to 90 cents. There 
are also auctions that have no bidding fee, which are called free auctions. Free auctions 
inherit other features of penny auction such as bidding increment and extendable 
countdown timer. Hence free auctions cannot be counted as traditional auctions.  
Though bidding fee may vary under different settings, it should be well designed so as to 
achieve a balance between obtaining more profit for auctioneer (by increasing the bidding 
fee) and stimulating bidder’s bidding (by reducing the bidding fee). A bidder will be 
charged more if the bidding fee is increased under the same number of bids. They may 
behave more “conservatively” and place fewer bids. In contrast, bidders may be happier 
if the bidding fee is lower, but this may cause a loss of profit from auctioneers’ views of 
point. Therefore, it would be an interesting question pending for future research. 
The existence of bidding fee may keep bidders bidding, provided that they have already 
placed at least a bid. This is because bidders will incur a certain amount of loss if they 
leave earlier without winning the auction. The only way to compensate the loss is to keep 
bidding till the bidder wins the auction. Therefore, the existence of bidding fee may play 
a positive role in retain bidders within an auction. 
2.1.2. Bidding Increment 
Bidding increment is the amount of item price that will be increased when a bidder places 
a bid. The bidding increment, when multiplied by number of bids in the auction, gets the 
final item price. This final item price is the actual price that the auction winner needs to 
pay for the item. For example, if in an iPhone 4 auction the bidding increment is 15 cents 
and there are totally 2000 bids, the winner of this auction can get the iPhone using only 




300 dollars (i.e 15 cents per bid multiplied by 2000 bids). Such a deep-discounted final 
price is the main reason bidders are pouring into penny auction. 
Similar to bidding fee auctioneers can vary bidding increment from case to case. 
Beezid.com, Quibids.com and bidcactus.com implement a bidding increment of 1 cent, 
while other penny auction websites like swoopo.com maintain a bidding increment of 15 
cents. 
Bidding increment needs to be carefully designed to obtain more profit from the penny 
auctioneer’s perspective. Auctioneer’s profit is the sum of final item price and total 
bidding fee less the item cost. At a first glance a larger bidding increment may help the 
auctioneer collects more profits given the same number of bids; but it also causes a fast 
increasing item price that may scare bidders from bidding. In contrast, if the bidding 
increment is low bidders may be benefited while the auctioneer will suffer from the 
losses from item selling. Therefore, a good bidding increment should be able to achieve a 
balance between bidder’s interests and auctioneer’s interests, conditional on other auction 
settings like bidding fee and time increment. 
2.1.3. Extendable Countdown Timer 
In penny auction, there is an extendable countdown timer which will be increased to 20 
seconds each time a new bid is placed. The intuitive purpose of the timer is to ensure the 
auction lasts as long as possible. Only when there are no other bidders bidding can the 
auction ends. Compared with hard-closing auctions like eBay auctions where there are 
pre-determined auction ending times, such extendable ending mode in penny auction is 
called soft-closing. 




A smaller time increment may reduce bidders’ cost of time, as they don’t have to wait too 
long for another bid. The time cost may be quite significant in an auction that has a large 
number of bidders. For example, each bid extend the timer to 20s and thus 2000 bids may 
make the auction last for 11 hours. Most of the bidders will bear a large time cost tracing 
this 11 hours auction. However, the small time increment could also cause an auction to 
end earlier and some bidders may miss the auction, resulting in a loss of money from the 
auctioneer’s point of view. Therefore, it is necessary to come out with a smart design of 
the countdown timer in penny auction, so as to cater for both bidders and auctioneers’ 
interests. 
2.1.4. Starting Price 
To attract the eyeballs of as many bidders as possible, penny auctions implement a zero 
starting price mechanism. That is, all the items sold on penny auction websites have 
initial prices of zero. In marketing this is called the loss-leader, meaning sacrificing one 
product price (i.e. to set deep-discounted selling price) to increase the user traffic. Penny 
auctions are extreme cases of loss-leader as all the items are of zero initial prices while 
loss-leader only suggests one or several such free products. In traditional loss-leader 
settings, the revenues of the sellers come from sales of other non-free products due to the 
increased traffic. In penny auction, however, the revenues come mainly from bidding fees 
and item final price. 
2.1.5. Auto-bidding Agents 
Auto-bidding agents have been widely applied on online auctions. The purposes of 
employing such auto-bidding agents are two-folded: (1) they provide more timely 




biddings, as the speed of placing a bid is obviously faster for an auto-agent than a human 
being using mouse. Where bidding time is important such auto-bidding agents become 
more important. (2) Auto-bidding agents are time saving tools and thus they reduce costs 
of time for bidders. In the context of penny auction, the auction ending time is 
undetermined as the existence of the extendable countdown timer and uncertain number 
of participants. Auto-bidding agents help those bidders to bid according their pre-
configured strategies. When setting an auto-bidding agent, a bidder needs only to 
determine the interval of the expected item price (i.e. the upper-bound of the item price 
and the lower-bound of the item price) and the number of tokens the bidder is willing to 
place. Then the auto-bidding agent will automatically place bids when the actual item 
price locates in the interval. 
For simplicity purpose, we treat auto bids the same as single bids (i.e. the bids place by a 
bidder individually) in the following analysis in this thesis. Such simplification is 
reasonable as auto-bidding agents, most of the cases, truly describe how a human bidder 
will react on specific current item price. When treating the bidding process as a black box, 
it won’t differ too much to unitize single bids and auto bids.  
2.1.6. Comparisons with eBay Auctions 
Table 2-1 shows the comparisons between penny auctions and eBay auctions. Penny 
auctions show significant differences from eBay auctions in term of both auction 
mechanisms and auction results. The constant bidding fee does not exist in eBay auctions 
because bidders are free to place bids in eBay auctions. Besides, each bid of penny 
auction will increase the item price by a small but constant amount, while in eBay 




auctions such increment can be quite flexible depending on the actual bid price that a 
bidder bid. For example, if the current item price is 10 dollars for an iPhone 4, next 
moment the item price will always be (10 plus bidding increment) in penny auction. 
However, the price may jump to 51 dollars in eBay auctions as long as there is a bidder 
that is willing to pay for the iPhone 4 at 51 dollars. 
Auction ending time is also different between penny auctions and eBay auctions. As 
mentioned, penny auctions implement a soft-closing ending mode where the ending time 
will be extended if there is a new bid. Thus the ending time is uncertain in penny auction. 
If there are interesting bidders who keep bidding, the penny auction may last for a very 
long time; otherwise if no one is willing to bid then the penny auction will end early. In 
contrast, on the eBay website the ending time of an auction is pre-determined and is 
known before a bidder participates. 
Starting price is constantly zero in penny auctions. This is mainly for the purpose of 
attracting bidders’ eyeballs so as to encourage them to participate in penny auction. In 
eBay auctions, however, the actual auction starting price is depended on the sellers. 
Sellers of eBay auctions may be too risky to launch a zero-starting price auction, because 
they cannot compensate the loss of item sell from bidding fees (like penny auctions). 
As for the auction outcomes, penny auctions can always end up with a deep-discounted 
price, and losers of a penny auction will have to pay for the bidding fees that constitute 
profits for auctioneers. However, in eBay auctions the outcomes are quite different. 
Firstly the final item price of an eBay auction may not be too low as it is the only source 
of profit for eBay auctioneers. Besides, a bidder who does not win the eBay auction 
needs not to pay any fee. 




Each of these novel features of penny auction are of interest for further research. It will 
be interesting to come out with an optimal combination of penny auction settings that can 
maximize either seller profit or consumer surplus. 
 
Table 2-1 : Comparison of Penny Auction and eBay Auction 
 
Penny Auction eBay Auction 
Auction Mechanisms 
Bidding fee Constant No 
Bidding increment Constant but small Flexible 
Ending time Extendable Fixed 
Starting price Zero Depends on sellers 
Auction Results 
Final item price Deeply discounted Flexible 
Auction losers Pay the token fees No monetary cost to bid 
Auctioneer profit 
Mainly from token fees  
incurred by all bidders 
Mainly from auction  
commissions of winners 
 
2.2. Research Motivation 
Though bidders will have to pay for bidding fees in penny auctions, the winner can still 
obtain considerable positive surplus from winning the auction. Therefore it is of bidders’ 
interests to win more auctions and grab larger surpluses. Previous penny auction studies 
suggest the existence of aggressive bidders who can utilize their experience and adopt 
more competitive bidding strategies to increase their winning probabilities. Compared 
with novice bidders who have less experience, it is reasonable to foresee that the 
aggressive bidders may dominate the novice bidders and win more auctions. These 
aggressive bidders may even build a reputation to scare novice bidders off from 
participating in penny auctions, which will result in a reducing number of total bidders. 




However, from penny auctioneers’ perspectives it is important to maintain a large pool of 
bidders. This is because the source of penny auction mainly comes from cumulative 
bidding fees and item sales, which is substantially a linear function of number of 
cumulative bids. And only when there are sufficient number of bidders can they generate 
sufficient number of cumulative bids to create enough revenue. Therefore, the dominance 
of aggressive bidders may cause a loss of profit for auctioneers because they reduce the 
number of total bidders. 
The dominance of aggressive bidders may become even more deteriorated in reality. In 
fact, we are reported from managers of PennyLeader
3
, one of the leading penny auctions 
in Asia that, there is a severe bidder retention issue on their website due to the existence 
of a small group of aggressive bidders. These aggressive bidders win the majority of the 
auctions, and there is an upheaval of complaints from the rest of the bidders about their 
difficulties in winning an auction. This phenomenon initiates our interests to help the 
penny auction industry solve the issue of bidder retention issue. 
2.2.1. The Case of PennyLeader 
PennyLeader is a leading penny auction website in Asia. PennyLeader launched in July 
2010. It has 17,000 registered bidders till January 2011. PennyLeader offered around 38 
penny auctions per day and has 920 active bidders on average per day. Main items 
auctioned on PennyLeader are electronic products, games, PCs, clothing, and other 
products that may appeal to younger target customers.  
                                                             
3 PennyLeader is a disguised name for the real penny auction website. We are not able to report the real 
name of the web site due to the confidentiality agreements.  




Since its inception in July 2010, PennyLeader experienced a period of high growth. In the 
first month, 145 new users signed up per day on average; and the peak of daily new 
registrations is 616. Some products sales were extremely successful. For example, the 
iPhone auction on August 2010 attracted 290 participants and generated $1400 USD in 
sales. However, since September 2010, PennyLeader had received several complaints 
from customers about the difficulty to win an auction. Some customers even questioned 
the credibility of PennyLeader all over the Internet forums, including on PennyLeader’s 
Facebook page. For example, some customer feedbacks were as follows: 
“I don’t know if this KIDDYWEAR is really a private user or commercial 
reseller, .... One person needs so many of the same items? Or he/she is very rich 
and really got very extended family. If bidding like that, who will want to try 
bidding with him? No fun already.”… September 5, 2010 at 1:54am 
“Well, I think we should all be a little smart here ... If we see people like 
KIDDYWEAR or anyone like him, we should not go and fight against them ... As 
long as we fight these aggressive bidders, the website operators will be happy to 
lined their pockets with our bids. After all, if we don't bid, we don't get hurt. What 
can we lose?”… September 22, 2010 at 4:20pm 
Simple statistics of the winning auctions confirmed the above complaints. Figure 2-2 
shows the distributions of winning auctions among winners
4
. We note that only 10.2% of 
the total bidders have won at least one auction before the implementation of the 3 bidding 
                                                             
4 The X-axis of Figure 2-2 denotes the cumulative percentage of auction, and the Y-axis presents the 
cumulative percentage of winner. The figure reveals the percentage of winning auctions that is 
corresponding to a certain percentage of unique bidders in the website. 




restriction rules on PennyLeader. As shown in Figure 2-2, among those winners, roughly 
20% (Y-axis) won 60% (X-axis) of the auctions and 50% (Y-axis) won 80% (X-axis) of 
the auctions. In other words, roughly 5% (i.e. 0.102*0.5) of all consumers won 80% of 
the auctions, an extremely skewed distribution of winning items. Because the only way to 
obtain positive surplus in penny auctions is via winning an auction, the results also 
suggest an extremely lopsided surplus distribution among bidders.  
 
 
Figure 2-2 : Winner Distribution of Ended Auction 
 
2.3. Research Questions 
To target the above issue of skewed surplus distribution, we implement the following 
three rules on PennyLeader’s website: 




 Rule 1: Each bidder is allowed to win a maximum of 8 auctions within 28 days. 
 Rule 2: Each bidder cannot win the same item more than once within 28 days. 
 Rule 3: Each bidder is allowed to participate in X concurrent auctions where X is 
equal to “8 minus the number of auctions won in the past 28 days”. 
The rationale behind these 3 rules is to adjust surplus distribution among bidders by 
limiting the behaviors of aggressive bidders. Therefore, we examine the following 
research questions: 
Research Question #1 (RQ1): Does the implementation of bidding restriction rules in 
penny auctions contribute to a more equalized distribution of bidders’ surplus across an 
auction market? 
Figure 2-2 demonstrates the extremely unequal distribution of winning auctions. As 
mentioned, 5% of the bidders won 80% of the auctions. These three rules targeted at 
mitigating this issue by enforcing the maximum number of auctions that a bidder can join 
and win. Since only the winner gains huge, as long as there are more bidders who can 
win, the surplus distribution should be more equalized. RQ1 examines the impacts of the 
three rules by comparing the equality of distribution of bidders’ surplus. It could be 
considered as our experiment treatment validity test as well. 
Research Question #2 (RQ2): Does the implementation of bidding restriction rules in 
penny auctions increase the probability of a unique bidder to bid at least once in each 
subsequent week? 
Previously, the low probability of winning an auction is an important factor that deterred 
most of the marginal bidders to participate in penny auctions. Winning an item could 




enhance the credibility of PennyLeader to that winning bidder because he learns from 
first-hand experience that it is possible to win or procure an auctioned good at such a low 
price. It could also enhance the auction provider’s credibility via online word-of-mouth 
from these winning bidders. Once a bidder can win an item, he may also raise his 
expectation about future winning probabilities. Therefore, we hypothesize that three rules 
enable more bidders to win an item, and more bidders may stay with PennyLeader over a 
longer period. 
Research Question #3 (RQ3): Does the implementation of bidding restriction rules in 
penny auctions increase the average number of auctions and the number of bids by a 
unique bidder in each subsequent week?  
Similarly, with the help of the three rules, bidders are more inclined to participate in more 
auctions and place more bids in the auctions they participated. The main reason is that 
winning bidders in the past may have higher expectations of their winning probabilities in 
the future auctions. For the penny auction models discussed in the extant literature 
(Augenblick 2009, Byers et al. 2010), higher expectations of winning probability will 
induce them to bid more aggressively in an auction, a result different from the standard 
second-price sealed-bid auction (Krishna 2009). Therefore, we propose two empirical 
models to test RQ3, which is discussed in more details in following chapters. 




2.4. Literature Review 
2.4.1. Penny Auction 
Penny auction has been a nascent yet popular topic in the auctions literature, and there are 
only a few papers on penny auction to the best of our knowledge. Augenblick (2009) is a 
pioneering paper in this area. He analyzed consumer behaviors in penny auctions by 
investigating the survival and hazard rates as well as the bidder’s bidding strategies. He 
found evidence that bidders overbid significantly, resulting in a considerable profit for 
the auctioneer. There is also evidence showing that experienced bidders will learn to 
apply certain bidding strategies to increase their winning probabilities. Among these 
strategies, the aggressive bidding strategy which implies bidding immediately whenever 
possible can lead to higher consumer surplus. This implies that bounded rational behavior 
by bidders may exist in penny auctions. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are only three other recent papers that have discussed 
penny auctions. Platt et al. (2010) proposed and tested a model of penny auction to 
predict the distribution of ending prices. Their results suggest that bidders of penny 
auction are risk-taking to some extent. Hinnossar (2010) found evidence of bounded 
rational behaviors in penny auctions, and he argued that these behaviors result from the 
similarities between gambling and penny auction. In other words, bidders in a penny 
auction can receive additional positive utilities (i.e., enjoyment) from participating. Using 
the simulation method, Byers et al. (2010) systematically analyzed the impacts of 
information asymmetry in penny auction settings. The authors concluded that the 




profitability of penny auctions is fragile, especially with the possible existence of 
collusion and shill biddings. 
Congruent to the findings from the literature, in our sample data set of penny auction 
biddings, we observe the existence of aggressive bidding strategies by a small group of 
bidders. Working with the penny auction operator, we thus designed a field experiment to 
restrict those aggressive bidders from winning and participating in more than 8 auctions. 
Unlike other prior studies of penny auctions, we thus can evaluate the exogenous impacts 
of the 3 bidding restriction rules implemented in order to provide a unique piece of 
research evidence and contribution to the penny auctions literature. 
2.4.2. Online Auction 
Various properties of traditional auctions have been studied in IS literatures. One of the 
highly cited pioneering paper in IS is Bapna et al (2004). The authors applied data mining 
techniques to classify bidders based on their bidding strategies and showed how bidders’ 
heterogeneity may affect the profitability of auctions operators. Along this line of studies, 
Chua et al. (2007) examined the importance of limiting online auction fraud. 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) investigated two types of regret in first-price 
sealed-bid auctions. Hinz and Spann (2008) studied the impacts of information diffusion 
of the secret reserve price in name-your-own-price auctions. Bapna et al. (2008) designed 
an innovative approach to measure the consumer surplus of bidders on eBay bidders. 
Their results suggest the median surplus is at least $4 per eBay auction. Gregg and 
Walczak (2008) examined two online auction businesses utilizing different company 
names and auction listing styles to sell items in parallel over the course of one year. 




Bapna et al. (2009) investigated bidders’ behaviors in overlapping auctions with the same 
products. Easley et al (2011) showed that more experienced bidders may apply more 
sophisticated bidding strategies and can avoid the winners’ curse. 
Some studies have also paid attention to adding restrictions to online auctions. For 
example, Adomavicius et al. (2009) pointed out that, in the case where bidders are 
restricted to a certain number of bids, this restriction has very little effect on a bidder’s 
ability to place strategic bids. However, it is also suggested that the number of such 
allowable bids is more important from the seller’s perspective, especially if the seller 
wants to restrict strategic bidding (Adomavicius et al. 2009). Bapna et al. (2002) 
indicated that most of the time the auctioneers cannot make optimal decisions in respect 
of auction design factors such as bid increment. This causes substantial losses especially 
in a market with already tight margins. 
2.4.3. Loss Leader 
In marketing, the loss leader strategy distinguishes from other retailer price promotion 
strategies by its deep discount price which usually is set at or below retailer cost. Losses 
can be made up on subsequent sales because such promotions with intense low price can 
incur incremental traffic to the stores, and as there are economies of scale in shopping, 
the sale of complementary items may grow (Neslin et al. 1995; Armstrong et al. 1993).  
In the field of IS, the strategy of loss leader can be applied into contexts such as free and 
open source software (FOSS). Hecker (2000) and Raymond (1999) propose several FOSS 
business strategies and argue that loss-leader is beneficial for market creating. Fitzgerald, 
B. (2006) give an example that, the free open source Sendmail product can enlarge the 




subsequent market for Sendmail Pro, a product with extra functionality that is distributed 
for a fee.  
Penny auction is an extreme case of loss leader application. In penny auctions all the item 
are sold at zero starting prices. It is reasonable to argue that with this strategy can 
contribute a significant increase of website traffic to penny auctioneers. 
2.4.4. Switching Cost 
Switching costs refers to the cost of switching from one service to another (Weiss and 
Anderson, 1992), or the incurred investment that constrains changes (Nielson, 1996). 
This may include perceived monetary and psychological costs, perceived disutility, and 
costs of switching providers (Jones et al., 2002; Chen and Hitt, 2002; Burnham et al., 
2003).  
Hannan and Freeman (1984) explain the linkage of structural inertia and organization 
change using switching costs. Their results suggest that even under unpleasant situation 
customers may still be reluctant to give up what they are doing with the existence of 
switching costs. Similarly, switching cost of an information system can affect the 
retention of customers and explain the continuous usage of an installed system (Hong et 
al., 2008; Chen and Hitt 2000). Whitten and Wakefield (2006) provide detailed 
discussion on switching cost and propose a model to measure switching cost in IT 
outsourcing services.  
The unique feature of bidding fee constitutes the source of switching cost in penny 
auctions. Once a bidder places a bid he may be reluctant to leave the penny auction until 




the auction ends. Therefore, switching cost from bidding fee helps penny auctions to keep 
bidder to continue bidding. 
2.4.5. Soft Closing Auction 
Soft closing auctions are auctions that implement an extendable ending time mechanism. 
In this type of auctions if there is a new bid, the auction will be extended by a certain 
amount of time. Contrast to soft closing auctions is the hard closing auctions which have 
a fixed ending time for each auction. 
Houser  and Wooders (2005) conduct a field experiment on auction closing rules and find 
that soft closing auctions result in significantly higher revenue for sellers than hard 
closing auctions. The study by Glover and Raviv (2007) suggests that there is a 40% 
increase of final item price in soft closing auctions than in hard closing auctions. Besides, 
Sherstyuk (2009) concludes that simultaneous ascending auctions with the soft closing 
rule yield the most efficient auctions.  
In penny auction, the soft closing mechanism is supported by the extendable countdown 
timer. Given that penny auctions are simultaneous auctions with ascending prices and 
soft closing, it is reasonable to argue that penny auctions is a type of efficient auctions, as 
suggested by Sherstyuk (2009). 
2.4.6. Customer Retention 
Customer retention has important implications for the management of customers and 
profits in a business. Importantly, it is widely documented across various industries that it 
costs more to acquire a new customer than to retain existing customers (Rosenberg and 




Czepiel 1993). In addition, increasing the share of returning customers, relative to new 
customers, can hugely contribute to the seller’s profits and market shares (Reichheld 
1996; Dick and Basu 1994; Dwyer 1997). A poor customer retention rate will have more 
negative effects than other factors such as the reduction in a consumer’s purchase 
quantities per order or transaction (Borle et al. 2005). In sum, all these point to the 
importance of retaining existing customers in a penny auction website and minimizing 
customer attrition due to dissatisfactions. 
From the theoretical viewpoint, the number of bidders is particularly important for 
auction sites. Most theories suggest that the number of bidders is positively correlated to 
the final auction price (Krishna 2009). For example, in the second-price auction 
mechanism, the final auction price is the willingness-to-pay (WTP) of the second highest 
bidder. The more the bidders are in one auction, the higher the second highest WTP 
among all bidders. Due to the competitive nature of penny auctions, the number of 
bidders is even more critical for ending at a higher final price and generating larger 
profits for operators. 
 




3. Data Description 
3.1. PennyLeader Dataset 
Starting from July 2010 and ending at mid-January 2011, our total dataset has five major 
tables: auction table, user table, bid table, ended auction table and user won auction table. 
The auction table contains basic information of 7488 auctions, covering the associated 
product names, auction names, auction types, auction starting and ending time, number of 
participants and so on. There are ten types of penny auctions, each having special 
auctions settings. Among the ten auction types, normal auction and free auction take up 
the majority, which have 1771 auctions and 5162 auctions, respectively. 
The user table is about bidder registration information such as login name, nickname, 
gender, birthday, address and postcode, registration date and account closing date. There 
are totally 17113 records in this table, containing bidders (all) from Singapore at the 
average age of 30. Around two-third of the bidders are male. 
Bid-level information is stored in the bid table. The bid table contains only a few 
variables but it is large. Each observation of this table contains information such as 
auction ID, timestamp, bid type (i.e. auto bid or single bid) and the current bidding price 
and bidder name. There are around 1.5 million records in the table. 
There are two other tables. The ended auction table stores information of auctions that 
have ended. It tells about the winner ID, auction ending time, final item price, sales and 
profits and so on. This table has 7338 observations and that means there is 7338 auctions’ 
information. 




The final table, the user won auction table, is organized in the way that describes which 
auction is won by which specific bidders. In other words, this table is from the winner’s 
perspective and is helpful for analyzing winner’s information. This contains auction and 
user IDs, number of tokens spent by the winner, closing bid time, and closing bid price. 
There are 7326 observations in this table. 
3.2. Selected Sample Dataset 
In this study we select a sample dataset consisting of 16 weeks’ data that is centered on 
23
rd
 Sep 2010 (i.e. the 38
th
 week of 2010) when the 3 rules are imposed. We compile a 
weekly panel dataset at the unique bidder’s level. Specifically, we consider only active 
bidders by applying the following criteria: (1) a bidder should bid at least once both 
before and after the rule changes; (2) it should be a bidder who registered on the website 
before the rules were implemented. In the first criterion we also exclude bidders who 
only bid before the rule changes. This is because for these bidders we cannot tell if it is 
the rules or their previous experiences that caused them not to bid even before the 
implementation of three rules. Besides, we also considered bidders’ closing their 
accounts. In this case, observations later than their closing time are removed. As a result, 
in the 16 weeks of sample period, we collected data of 271 products, 924 auctions, and 
263,435 bids from 586 unique bidders. The average age of these bidders is 31 year old, 
and 381 out of the 586 bidders are male (65%). 




3.3. Descriptive Analysis of the Effects of the Rules 
We conduct a descriptive analysis to show the effects of the rule changes on all bidders. 
Table 3-1 shows daily statistics data comparing before the rule change with after the rule 
change.  In the column of rule change, 0 represents before the rule change and 1 is after 
the rule change. Here we compare only free auctions where there are no bidding fee and 
normal auctions that have a bidding fee of 75 cents.  
As can be seen from Table 3-2, it seems that all variables (e.g. profit per auction, sales 
per auction, number of bidder per auction) are reducing. However a further analysis 
shows that this is caused by the fact that number of auction launched per day is increasing 
dramatically after the rule change compared to before the rule change. Hence, by dividing 
by a larger base of auction number, the variables may reduce.  
Table 3-3 shows statistics data of each bidder on an average level. As can be seen, each 
individual bidder increases their involvements on penny auction, in the sense that there 
are significantly increased profits contributed by each bidder, sales per bidders and 
number of auctions participated per bidder. In fact, the results suggest that bidders are 
more likely to participate in penny auction with the introduction of the 3 rules. 
Similarly, we plot Figure 3-1 to show the change of winning auction distribution after the 
rule introduction. As can be seen, the blue line suggests that auctions are won by larger 
percentages of bidders. For example, previously around 60 percent of the auctions (Y-
axis) are won by 20 percent of the bidders. After the rule change, 20 percent of the 
bidders are only able to win around 50 percent of the auctions, leaving more 




opportunities for other bidders to win. Hence, it suggests a fairer surplus distribution 
among bidders after the rule change. 






























































































































































































































































































Figure 3-1 : Winner Distribution of Ended Auction (Post) 
 
3.4. Descriptive Analysis of Each of The 3 Rules 
We provide descriptive statistics of each rule. For example, Table 3-4 shows the 
comparison between rule 1 violators and non-violators. Focusing only on normal 
auctions, individual surplus increases after the rule change for non-violators and number 
of bids increases as well. For rule 1 violators, they have a reducing number of bids and 
reducing surplus. Combined together, the results suggests that after the rule change, non-
violators of rule 1 are on average better off and increase their involvements, while 
violators reduce their aggressive bidding behaviors after the rule change, as a result of the 
reducing surplus. Similarly, comparison of rule 2 in Table 3-5 draws similar conclusions.  
Table 3-6 shows the statistic results of rule 3. Though the results are not fully consistent 
with our perdition, it is still reasonable in our context. This is because rule 3 is quite a 
loose rule that, essentially, not well designed. There are in fact not many bidders bidding 
concurrently on several auctions, and even if they bid concurrently they may not be 




accounted as the frequent (or aggressive) bidders. Hence rule 3 violators may contain 
both aggressive bidders and non-aggressive bidders. The results shown here mainly for 
statistical purpose and may not be suggestive enough. 
There is a limitation of the results shown here. In this study, we impose the 3 rules 
concurrently and do not separate them. In this case it may not be appropriate for us to do 
the analysis separately for each of the rule, because the effect of one rule may have been 
affected by other rules. To overcome this limitation, in the future we may conduct a new 
field experience by imposing each of the rules one by one. 
 
 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































4. Research Method and Models 
4.1. Research Design: A Field Experiment 
To recap, the 3 bidding restriction rules implemented in the field experiment were:  
 Rule 1: Each bidder is allowed to win a maximum of 8 auctions within 28 days. 
 Rule 2: Each bidder cannot win the same item more than once within 28 days. 
 Rule 3: Each bidder is allowed to participate in X concurrent auctions where X is 
equal to “8 minus the number of auctions won in the past 28 days”. 
Rule 1 is the most important restriction that directly limits the participation of the bidders 
and also distributes winning chances to a broader set of customers. Rule 2 restricts the 
resale opportunities of bidders since some bidders buy items at extremely low price and 
later resell it somewhere else for a profit. Also, Rule 2 redistributes “bargain tokens” to a 
more dispersed group of bidders. PennyLeader also regularly conducts many auctions of 
token packs. Rule 2 eliminates the opportunities for the same bidder to win a lot of tokens 
at low costs and later use those tokens to execute aggressive “predatory” bidding 
strategies. Rule 3 is similar to Rule 1 in spirit but it further restricts the number of 
concurrent auctions that a bidder could participate in. 
The 3 bidding restrictions became effective from September 23
rd
 in 2010, two months 
after PennyLeader was launched. Notifications and announcements were sent to all 
bidders to ensure that all users were aware of the new restrictions. PennyLeader started 
keeping track of the number of items won for each bidder after September 23
rd
. That is, a 




bidder could have won 9 items on September 24
th. But, after 28 days of “grace period”, 
all bidders must have won less than 8 auctions in the past 28 days. 
We choose the sample period for data analysis as 8 weeks before and after the rules 
implementation, that is, from the 30
th
 week to the 46
th
 week, centered on the 38
th
 week 
when the 3 rules were implemented. There are several benefits of this sample period. 
First, it is longest symmetric sample period around the rules implementation date. Second, 
fortunately, this sample period does not extend to December, during which sales surged 
because of the Christmas holiday, avoiding possible seasoning effects. 
In the following steps of experiment, we will track the unique bidders’ behaviors on 
products auctions (non-token auctions) during the sample period. We also controlled for 
product assortment before and after the rule implementation. Among the products 
auctioned off that were included in our empirical analysis, these constitute 90% of all 
products auctioned off in the same period. 
4.2. Definitions of Variables 
4.2.1. Independent Variable 
(1) A Dummy Variable That Indicates Before and After the Rules Change. 
We create a dummy variable       indicating if the three rules have been implemented 
across the weeks. In the weekly panel dataset,       is 1 if the week number is larger than 
the 38
th
 week of 2010 (i.e. the week when the rules were introduced), otherwise it is equal 
to 0. 




4.2.2. Dependent Variables 
(1) Consumer Surplus (for Model 1) 
We define the consumer surplus for bidder j as follows.  
    
                                                                     
                              
  
Here, since we do not have the willingness-to-pay of each bidder, we are forced to use the 
suggested retail price as a proxy. The suggested retailed price is listed on the 
PennyLeader website and is observable to all bidders. As a consequence, to be more 
precise, this measure of consumer surplus should be interpreted as the surplus for a 
bidder to use PennyLeader, benchmarking against buying the same product from other 
retailers at the suggested retail price. The suggested retail price posted on PennyLeader is 
higher than the average actual retail price, which is a common marketing tactic that takes 
advantage of the framing effect (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). 
(2) Gini Cofficients (for Model 1) 
The most prevalent measure of inequality in the literature is Gini Coefficient, which is 
widely used to measure the income disparity. The standard Gini coefficient ranges from 0 
to 1, and a value of 0 represents perfect equality (Christian and Weiner, 2000). Similarly, 
a value of 1 expresses a status of extreme inequality, in which one person earns all 
income while the others earn nothing. 
We need to adopt a modified Gini coefficient in this study because many bidders have 
negative surplus. The procedure to compute a standard Gini coefficient simply treats all 
negative records as zero. The economics literature (Mishra et al. 2002) suggests an 




alternative formula to account for the negative surplus of consumers in our penny 
auctions context: 
   
         
 
    
   
 
            
 
             
 
    
   
 
   
    
        
 
where           and       
 
       . n denotes the total number of bidders,    is 
the surplus of bidder j,    is the share of surplus of bidder j, and m denotes the size of the 
subset of the bidders whose accumulated surplus is zero in the order of        . 
(3) FGT Metrics (for Model 1) 
As a supplement of the Gini coefficient, we include the FGT metrics that can also be used 
to analyze equality of surplus distribution. There are three well-known FGT metrics: (1) 
headcount (HC) that measures the incidence of poverty; (2) poverty gap index (PGI) that 
reveals the intensity of poverty; and (3) squared poverty gap index (SPGI) that depicts the 
income inequality among the poor. The higher values these metrics are, the higher level 
of poverty there is. The general specification of FGT metrics is 








   
 
where z is the poverty line, N is the number of individuals in the system, H is the number 
of poor, yi is the income of individual i, and α is a parameter determining the 
specification of the formula. When α is set as 0, the above formula results in the 
headcount equation: 














Similar, when α equals to 1 or 2, we have formulas of the Poverty Gap Index (PGI) and 
Squared Poverty Gap Index (SPGI), respectively, which are specified as 




    
 
 
   
 









   
 
As α increases, individual with lower income is given more weight in the measure. 
(4) Consumer Retention (for Model 2) 
For each unique bidder in each week, we create a dummy variable: it is one when the 
bidder spent at least one token in that week and is zero otherwise. 
(5) Auctions Participation (for Model 3) 
We operationalize “participation” in two ways: (1) the number of auctions participated by 
a unique bidder in one week; (2) the number of tokens spent by a unique bidder in one 
week. 
4.2.3. Key Control Variables 
(1) Bidder Types (for Models 2 and 3) 
We split bidders into two groups: frequent (aggressive) bidders and occasional (marginal) 
bidders. Frequent bidders are defined as bidders who violated any one of the three rules 
before September 23
rd
 2010. In other words, it is highly possible that these bidders may 




be constrained by the three rules. Occasional bidders are the rest of the bidders who never 
violated three rules before September 23
rd
 2010. In other words, those bidders supposedly 
may not be affected by the three rules after September 23
rd
 2010. However, they may be 
indirectly affected by the rules change because frequent bidders will bid less after the 
rules change. Occasional bidders may win more and also could bid more due to their 
higher expectation of winning chances.  
It is straightforward to infer that three rules may have opposite impacts on these two 
types of bidders: those frequent aggressive bidders are the target to be confined whereas 
those occasional marginal bidders are the target to be encouraged to participate more. 
Therefore, we will conduct regression analyses on two groups of bidders separately. 
(2) Consumer Surplus History (for Models 2 and 3) 
Our conceptual framework proposes that three rules may lead to more equalized 
consumer surplus. Suppose consumers form expectations based on their previous 
experience at the penny auction site. We believe consumers with larger surplus in the past 
may participate more in the future auctions.  
We create four control variables based on the history of consumer surplus of each unique 
bidder. First, we use the weekly consumer surplus right before the target week. We 
further redefine this variable into two variables: win surplus and loss surplus if the bidder 
receive positive and negative surplus, respectively. Specifically, win surplus is defined as 
the total surplus that a bidder obtain in a week if it is positive and it is zero otherwise. 
This approach is consistent with the marketing literature (Narayanan and Manchanda 
2006). The rationale is that bidders may have different sensitivity to their previous gains 
and loss. For example, if the bidders are risk-averse or loss aversion, they may react more 




to the loss surplus than the win surplus. For completeness, we also create two similar 
variables using the cumulative life-time total win surplus and loss surplus, rather than the 
lagged one week’s surplus. In particular, we also note that variables for the lagged one-
week win and loss surplus controls for recency effects in auction participation outcomes, 
while the variables measuring cumulative total win surplus and loss surplus control for 
primacy effects in auction participation outcomes. Theoretically, the past surplus and 
cumulative surplus are motivated by previous literatures of recency and primacy effects 
(Miller and Campbell 1959; Davelaar et al. 2005; Farr 1973; Anderson and Barrios 1961). 
(3) The Number of Products Auctioned in One Week (for Models 2 and 3) 
In order to explain bidder participation behaviors in Models 2 and 3, it is intuitive to 
assume that the number and the type of products are highly correlated with the bidding 
participation of all bidders. Particularly, if there are more popular products auctioned in a 
specific week, on average more participation from any type of bidders may occur.  
We include two variables to control for the impacts of product offerings. One variable is 
the number of hot products sold in the target week. We define hot products by finding the 
10% most popular products during the 16-weeks sample period. The popularity of 
products is calculated by ranking the associated auctions from high to low by the number 
of participants. The rest of products are defined as common products. We use the number 
of common products as the other control variable.  
(4) Profile of Overall Bidder Surplus (for Model 2 and 3) 
There is a gap between the first research question and the other two. Specifically, 
research question 1 analyzes the effect of bidding restriction at a macro level, that is, the 




overall bidder surplus distribution. Research question 2 and 3, however, target at a micro 
level by analyzing individual number of auctions participated and number of bids place 
within a period of time. Hence, it is necessary to bridge this gap by linking the macro 
level analysis and the micro level analysis.  
To do this, we include several control variables that measure the profile of overall bidder 





 percentile as well as 50
th
 percentile and 25
th
 percentile of bidder 
surplus in the group
5
 are also used to reveal the effects of bidder surplus changes on 
bidder participation behaviors. More specifically, the 90
th
 percentile of bidder surplus is 





 percentile of surplus apply the same idea as well. Note that these 
percentile surpluses are lagged for one week.  
Table 4-1 provides descriptive statistics of the above mentioned variables, and Table 4-2 
depicts correlation between continuous variables. Except in the last six rows, the number 
of observations is at the bidder-auction level. In other words, 3480 observations mean 
435 unique bidders in 8 week. Therefore, we have 435 occasional bidders and 69 frequent 
bidders in this balanced panel dataset. Without any sophisticated statistical analysis, we 
can observe that 3 rules seem to be quite influential on bidding behaviors. Retention rate 
of the occasional bidders increases from 19% to 26%. The average number of bids from 
occasional bidders increases from 6.60 to 7.59 where as the number of auctions 
participated increases from 0.52 to 0.57. On the contrary, the average number of bids 
                                                             
5 The term of “group” indicates either a bidder belongs to frequent bidder or occasional bidder. 




from frequent bidders decreases from 44.68 to 31.54 where as the number of auctions 
participated increases from 2.71 to 1.69. We will rigorously examine the impacts of 3 
rules after controlling for various covariates. 
 
 




Table 4-1 : Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Before rule changes After rule changes 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Occasional bidders 
Dummy of customer retention 3480 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 3480 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
No. of bids 3480 6.60 36.36 0.00 900.00 3480 7.59 35.32 0.00 859.00 
No. of auctions 3480 0.52 1.45 0.00 14.00 3480 0.57 1.40 0.00 16.00 
Amount of win last week 3480 2.35 28.19 0.00 927.25 3480 2.42 23.79 0.00 752.50 
Amount of loss last week 3480 -2.93 16.62 -396.00 0.00 3480 -4.48 18.91 -576.25 0.00 
Cumulative amount of win 3480 9.68 65.02 0.00 927.25 3480 36.15 128.30 0.00 1263.00 
Cumulative amount of loss 3480 -12.11 42.49 -567.75 0.00 3480 -52.22 86.04 -812.25 0.00 
Frequent bidders 
Dummy of customer retention 552 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 552 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
No. of bids 552 44.68 126.88 0.00 1721.00 552 31.54 77.66 0.00 716.00 
No. of auctions 552 2.71 4.12 0.00 25.00 552 1.69 2.93 0.00 19.00 
Amount of win last week 552 27.26 120.68 0.00 1512.25 552 23.68 101.11 0.00 1090.75 
Amount of loss last week 552 -9.83 31.83 -467.25 0.00 552 -13.68 32.74 -287.00 0.00 
Cumulative amount of win 552 100.46 278.33 0.00 1813.25 552 391.31 658.70 0.00 3357.50 
Cumulative amount of loss 552 -31.45 61.05 -561.75 0.00 552 -175.17 144.36 -736.50 0.00 
Unique Number of Products (Weekly) 
No. of hot products 8 14.38 1.19 12.00 16.00 8 12.88 3.98 8.00 18.00 
No. of common product 8 23.38 7.63 11.00 34.00 8 36.25 7.05 21.00 43.00 
Gini Coefficient 8 0.98 0.01 0.97 1.00 8 0.96 0.03 0.91 0.99 
90th Percentile Surplus 8 11.44 23.57 -0.75 60.75 8 19.41 29.63 -0.75 82.00 
75th Percentile Surplus 8 -1.59 0.63 -3.00 -0.75 8 -1.31 0.53 -2.25 -0.75 
50th Percentile Surplus 8 -5.25 1.06 -6.75 -3.75 8 -5.06 2.43 -9.75 -1.50 






Table 4-2 : Correlation Between Continuous Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) No. of Bids 1.00 
           
(2) No. of Auctions 0.60 1.00 
          
(3) Amount of Win Last Week 0.28 0.22 1.00 
         
(4) Amount of Loss Last Week -0.15 -0.21 0.03 1.00 
        
(5) Cumulative Amount of Win 0.26 0.23 0.40 -0.16 1.00 
       
(6) Cumulative Amount of Loss -0.14 -0.17 -0.08 0.37 -0.41 1.00 
      
(7) No. of Hot Products 0.06 0.08 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.16 1.00 
     
(8) No. of Common Products 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.13 -0.30 -0.39 1.00 
    
(9) Gini Coefficient -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.07 0.14 -0.48 -0.39 1.00 
   
(10) 90th Percentile Surplus 0.15 0.23 0.17 -0.11 0.18 -0.15 -0.15 -0.03 0.16 1.00 
  
(11) 75th Percentile Surplus 0.05 0.08 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.14 0.01 0.49 1.00 
 
(12) 50th Percentile Surplus -0.11 -0.14 -0.06 0.09 -0.15 0.13 0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.20 0.15 1.00 
 
 




4.3. Regression Models 
4.3.1. Model 1: Linear Regression 
To examine our research question 1, we use a simple OLS regression model with the 
adjusted Gini coefficient as the key dependent variable (Wooldridge 2009). We are 
interested in whether Gini coefficient decreases after the rules change. Therefore, we 
have the regression model 
                
where Gt is the value of the adjusted Gini coefficient at time t,         is a dummy 
variable indicating if the rules are implemented at time t. 
As a supplement of Gini coefficient, we calculate the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) 
metrics to measure the equality of bidder surplus. There are three metrics provided by 
FGT: headcount, poverty gap index (PGI) and squared poverty gap index (SPGI). Similar 
to Gini coefficient, we run a linear regression on these three metrics to test the 
significance of the rule dummy. The regression model of FGT metrics is as follows: 
                        
                  
                   
where            is the value of headcount at week t,      is the value of poverty gap 
index at the week of t, and       is the associated squared poverty gap index. 




4.3.2. Model 2: Logit Regression 
To investigate our research question 2, we use the following panel logit regression 
(Wooldridge 2009). This analysis is conducted at the unique bidder level with “one week” 
as one period in this panel dataset. We choose one week due to the following reasons. 
First, there is a bidding pattern differences on different weekdays. Using weekly panel 
data eliminates the weekday effects. Second, weekly panel data leads to an appropriate 
number of sample records. 
Therefore, we model the probability of bidder’s participation as (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2005) 
             
          
            
 
where y is the binary outcome dependent variable in which 1 represents participating: the 
target bidder bids at least once in that week and y=0 otherwise. xit is a vector of covariates 
for bidder i at time t which includes: (1) dummy variable of rule changes; (2) past 
consumer surplus; and (3) auction product types. 
4.3.3. Model 3: Negative Binomial Regression 
As can be seen from Table 4-1 about descriptive statistics, there exists an issue of over 
dispersion in our dataset. Specifically, the variances of the variables are larger than the 
means of the associated variables, which may be caused by unobserved heterogeneity. To 
take into account this observation, we apply Negative Binomial model as the principal 
count model to estimate number of auctions and number of bids. The specification of the 
Negative Binomial model is as follows: 




         
        
            
 
   
     
 
   
 
 




          
    
                  
where y denotes number of auctions participated (or number of bids placed) within a 
week, x is a vector of covariates including the dummy variable of rule changes and 
control variables, Γ(.) denotes the gamma integral which specializes to a factorial for an 
integer argument, and      .  




5. Results and Findings 
5.1. RQ1: Equality of Consumer Surplus 
Figure 5-1 plots the time series of the adjusted Gini coefficients based on bidder’s weekly 
surplus. As shown in this figure, Gini coefficients are higher before the rules change (i.e. 
the 38
th
 week of the year), and they fluctuated between 0.96 and 0.99. This is consistent 
with our earlier claim that a small proportion of the bidders earn most of the consumer 
surplus, resulting in a high level of unfairness. 
The introduction of three rules did not improve the surplus distribution immediately. 
There is no drop until the 40
th
 week, 2 weeks after the rule changes. This could result 
from the grace period. The Gini coefficients were much lower between the 40
th
 and the 
43
rd
 week, which visually confirms our prediction that the rules may improve the surplus 
distribution. However, the Gini coefficients seem to deteriorate (rise) again after Week 
44
th
, which could imply the effects of rules change diminished in the end. 
We further conduct a regression to check if there is a statistically significant effect of the 
rules on the Gini coefficients. As shown in Table 5-1, the dummy variable of rules 
change is significantly negative. Hence, three rules indeed improve the inequality among 
bidders: Gini coefficients became smaller. In sum, we can conclude that the three bidding 








Table 5-1 : Regression on Gini Coefficients 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficients 
8 Weeks’ Window 4 Weeks’ Window 










Observations 16 8 
R-squared 0.2860 0.4822 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
5.2. RQ2: Bidder Retention 
Table 5-2 reports the results of Model 2 that applies Logit model to estimate bidder’s 
retention rate. Bidder retention is defined as a bidder’s probability of participation in 
Model 2, results of which are shown in column (a). As can be seen, the coefficient of the 
independent variable (the dummy variable of rule change) has different effects on 
occasional bidders and frequent bidders. Specifically, the coefficient is significantly 
positive for occasional bidders, suggesting that the rules increase occasional bidder’s 
participation probability. We further calculate the marginal effects of the dummy 
 

























































variable, from which we get 0.11. This implies that occasional bidder’s probability of 
participation is increased by 11% with the introduction of the rules. Therefore, we 
conclude that the bidding restrictions have an economically and statistically significant 
impact on occasional bidder’s retention. 
For frequent bidders, the rules do not reduce their participation rate, as the coefficient of 
the rule dummy is not significant. This suggests the ideal outcome that we expect: 
frequent bidders all maintain the same level of participation whereas occasional bidders 
increase their chances to bid.  
To further acquaint more understandings of the effects of the rules, covariates such as 
bidder’s surplus history and website specific variables are added to the model. The 
estimated results of these additional models are shown in Column (b) and Column (f) of 
Table 5-2. As shown, controlling either bidder-specific or website-specific variables does 
not change the previous results. The coefficients of the rule dummy are consistently 
positive for occasional bidders, while they are negative for frequent bidders. 
5.3. RQ3: Auctions Participation by Bidders 
Using Negative Binomial models, we analyze bidder’s auction participation from two 
perspectives: the number of auctions they participate and the number of bids they place. 
The results of the regressions are shown in Table 5-3 and Table 5-4. Generally, the rules 
have positive effects on occasional bidders but negative effects on frequent bidders, 
either it is with respect to number of bids or number of auctions. All control variables are 
significant in most of the cases. 




The interpretations of the coefficients of the dummy variables in Column (a) of Table 5-3 
are as follows: the three rules increase the expected number of bids of occasional bidders 
by 1.43 (=exp(0.3593)) times whereas three rules decrease the expected number of bids 
of frequent bidders by 0.86 (=exp(-0.1538)) times.  This result is qualitatively similar to 
that in our model 2.  Because there are 86% occasional bidders in our sample, we can 
conclude that three rules increase the expected number of bids by 
1.43*86%+0.86*14%=1.35 times. If we use the results from the full model in Column (d), 
three rules become even more impactful, it could increase the expected number of bids by 
1.79 times. 
With respect to the number of auctions in Column (e), our results suggest that occasional 
bidders participated in 1.37 (=exp(0.3121)) or 2.10 (=exp(0.7422)) times more auctions 
whereas frequent bidders participated in 0.75 (=exp(-0.2862)) or 0.35 (=exp(-1.0617)) 
times fewer auctions. The overall effect is that three rules could have increased the 
participation in the number of auctions by 28% or 86%.   





Table 5-2 : Results of Model 2 (Binary Logit Model of Participation Probability) 
VARIABLES 

























Dummy of Rule Changes 0.4466*** -0.1600 0.8477*** -0.1741 0.8494*** -0.5203** 1.1128*** -1.0442*** 
(0.0598) (0.1334) (0.0736) (0.1963) (0.0873) (0.2219) (0.1004) (0.3436) 
Amount of Win Last Week   0.0105*** 0.0060*** 0.0105*** 0.0058*** 0.0105*** 0.0049*** 
  (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0017) 
Amount of Loss Last Week   -0.0209*** -0.0197*** -0.0193*** -0.0184*** -0.0190*** -0.0151*** 
  (0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0022) (0.0036) 
Cumulative Previous Amount of Win   -0.0002 0.0005** -0.0001 0.0006** -0.0001 0.0005* 
  (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) 
Cumulative Previous Amount of Loss   0.0094*** 0.0014 0.0084*** 0.0014 0.0085*** 0.0011 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0012) 
No. of Hot Product in the Week     0.0794*** 0.1364*** 0.1567*** 0.1160* 
    (0.0113) (0.0280) (0.0207) (0.0594) 
No. of Common Product in the Week     0.0040 0.0414*** 0.0140*** 0.0726*** 
    (0.0047) (0.0112) (0.0054) (0.0144) 
Gini Coefficient of the Week       13.1460*** -4.8867 
      (2.4034) (8.1720) 
90th Percentile Surplus Among 
Bidders in the Group 
      -0.0024 0.0062*** 
      (0.0016) (0.0013) 
75th Percentile Surplus Among 
Bidders in the Group 
      0.3668*** -0.0082*** 
      (0.0837) (0.0031) 
50th Percentile Surplus Among 
Bidders in the Group 
      -0.0766*** -0.0279 
      (0.0262) (0.0181) 
Observations 6,960 1,088 6,960 1,088 6,960 1,088 6,960 1,088 
Number of bidder_id2 435 68 435 68 435 68 435 68 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 




Table 5-3 : Results of Model 3 (Negative Binomial Regression of No. of Bids) 

























Dummy of Rule Changes 0.3593*** -0.1538* 0.4003*** -0.3018*** 0.4957*** -0.4891*** 0.7065*** -0.9042*** 
(0.0509) (0.0854) (0.0546) (0.1120) (0.0707) (0.1328) (0.0782) (0.1940) 
Amount of Win Last Week   0.0031*** 0.0014*** 0.0028*** 0.0014*** 0.0030*** 0.0013*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Amount of Loss Last Week   -0.0061*** -0.0052*** -0.0053*** -0.0045*** -0.0051*** -0.0037*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0009) 
Cumulative Previous Amount 
of Win 
  0.0004* 0.0005*** 0.0005** 0.0005*** 0.0004* 0.0005*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Cumulative Previous Amount 
of Loss 
  0.0013*** 0.0003 0.0008** 0.0000 0.0008* -0.0001 
  (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
No. of Hot Product in the 
Week 
    0.0756*** 0.0900*** 0.1421*** 0.0577 
    (0.0093) (0.0165) (0.0172) (0.0354) 
No. of Common Product in 
the Week 
    -0.0028 0.0198*** 0.0068 0.0375*** 
    (0.0039) (0.0070) (0.0044) (0.0086) 
Gini Coefficient of the Week       11.1602*** -6.6893 
      (1.9646) (4.9171) 
90th Percentile Surplus 
Among Bidders in the Group 
      -0.0022 0.0041*** 
      (0.0014) (0.0008) 
75th Percentile Surplus 
Among Bidders in the Group 
      0.2775*** -0.0050** 
      (0.0690) (0.0020) 
50th Percentile Surplus 
Among Bidders in the Group 
      -0.0564** -0.0264** 
      (0.0222) (0.0108) 
Constant -2.9964*** -1.8345*** -3.0197*** -1.9592*** -4.0478*** -3.7047*** -16.0112*** 2.1900 
(0.0442) (0.0679) (0.0451) (0.0714) (0.1850) (0.3244) (2.1763) (5.2460) 
Observations 6,960 1,104 6,960 1,104 6,960 1,104 6,960 1,104 
Number of bidder_id2 435 69 435 69 435 69 435 69 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 




Table 5-4 : Results of Model 3 (Negative Binomial Regression of No. of Auctions) 
VARIABLES 

























Dummy of Rule Changes 0.3121*** -0.2862*** 0.4525*** -0.3510*** 0.5243*** -0.5984*** 0.7422*** -1.0617*** 
(0.0503) (0.0816) (0.0559) (0.1119) (0.0709) (0.1258) (0.0772) (0.1803) 
Amount of Win Last Week   0.0035*** 0.0009*** 0.0033*** 0.0010*** 0.0035*** 0.0008*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
Amount of Loss Last Week   -0.0068*** -0.0048*** -0.0060*** -0.0044*** -0.0059*** -0.0034*** 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Cumulative Previous Amount of 
Win 
  0.0001 0.0004*** 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0003*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Cumulative Previous Amount of 
Loss 
  0.0029*** 0.0006 0.0023*** 0.0006 0.0024*** 0.0005 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
No. of Hot Product in the Week     0.0709*** 0.0786*** 0.1411*** 0.0329 
    (0.0091) (0.0158) (0.0170) (0.0329) 
No. of Common Product in the 
Week 
    -0.0020 0.0272*** 0.0076* 0.0445*** 
    (0.0038) (0.0067) (0.0043) (0.0081) 
Gini Coefficient of the Week       11.6413*** -8.6883* 
      (1.9259) (4.5762) 
90th Percentile Surplus Among 
Bidders in the Group 
      -0.0021 0.0044*** 
      (0.0014) (0.0007) 
75th Percentile Surplus Among 
Bidders in the Group 
      0.3172*** -0.0061*** 
      (0.0685) (0.0019) 
50th Percentile Surplus Among 
Bidders in the Group 
      -0.0620*** -0.0185* 
      (0.0221) (0.0101) 
Constant -1.5510*** -0.5252*** -1.5014*** -0.6305*** -2.4758*** -2.3492*** -14.9171*** 5.7871 
(0.0565) (0.0880) (0.0596) (0.0922) (0.1861) (0.3157) (2.1334) (4.8800) 
Observations 6,960 1,104 6,960 1,104 6,960 1,104 6,960 1,104 
Number of bidder_id2 435 69 435 69 435 69 435 69 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




5.4. Robustness Check 
To conduct robustness of the Negative Binomial model, we use the panel Poisson 
regression which is widely applied to model nonnegative integer dependent variable 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). In order to apply the Poisson model, following 
assumptions are made: (1) the dependent variable has a Poisson distribution; and (2) the 
occurrences of a bid and participating in an auction (i.e. auction participation) are 
independent. Therefore, we have the Poisson regression model specification: 
            
        
          
        
where y denotes number of auctions participated (or number of bids placed) within a 
week, x is a vector of covariates including the dummy variable of rule changes and 
control variables.  
As shown in Table 5-5 and Table 5-6, there provide consistent results as Table 5-3 and 
Table 5-4: the variable of interests (i.e. the dummy of rule changes) is of the same 
coefficient sign as the original models. Besides, we also consider the effect of the grace 
period in this robustness check. The grace period covers the first 28 days after 23
rd
 Sep 
2010. We exclude observations during this period and rerun Model 2 and 3. The results 
of which are shown in Table 5-7. The results verify our previous results as well. In a 
nutshell, we are satisfied with the robustness of results from our original models. 
  





Table 5-5 : Results of Model 3 (Poisson Regression of No. of Bids) 

























Dummy of Rule Changes 0.1393*** -0.3483*** 0.8246*** -0.0255 0.5855*** -0.2760*** 0.6621*** -0.7067*** 
(0.0090) (0.0099) (0.0120) (0.0157) (0.0136) (0.0164) (0.0162) (0.0230) 
Amount of Win Last Week   0.0038*** 0.0009*** 0.0035*** 0.0010*** 0.0036*** 0.0009*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Amount of Loss Last Week   -0.0052*** -0.0031*** -0.0049*** -0.0028*** -0.0051*** -0.0024*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Cumulative Previous Amount 
of Win 
  -0.0005*** -0.0000 -0.0005*** -0.0001*** -0.0006*** -0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Cumulative Previous Amount 
of Loss 
  0.0052*** 0.0017*** 0.0052*** 0.0019*** 0.0052*** 0.0017*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
No. of Hot Product in the Week     0.0908*** 0.0849*** 0.0997*** 0.0325*** 
    (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0032) (0.0043) 
No. of Common Product in the 
Week 
    0.0239*** 0.0366*** 0.0200*** 0.0440*** 
    (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Gini Coefficient of the Week       1.9846*** -9.5377*** 
      (0.3585) (0.5634) 
90th Percentile Surplus Among 
Bidders in the Group 
      -0.0018*** 0.0034*** 
      (0.0003) (0.0001) 
75th Percentile Surplus Among 
Bidders in the Group 
      0.3147*** -0.0065*** 
      (0.0123) (0.0003) 
50th Percentile Surplus Among 
Bidders in the Group 
      -0.1239*** -0.0276*** 
      (0.0042) (0.0013) 
Observations 6,960 1,104 6,960 1,104 6,960 1,104 6,960 1,104 
Number of bidder_id2 435 69 435 69 435 69 435 69 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 





Table 5-6 : Results of Model 3 (Poisson Regression of No. of Auctions) 

























Dummy of Rule Changes 0.0970*** -0.4746*** 0.5004*** -0.4352*** 0.4899*** -0.6275*** 0.7319*** -1.0247*** 
(0.0326) (0.0417) (0.0397) (0.0650) (0.0465) (0.0677) (0.0517) (0.0957) 
Amount of Win Last Week   0.0042*** 0.0007*** 0.0041*** 0.0008*** 0.0042*** 0.0007*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Amount of Loss Last Week   -0.0059*** -0.0047*** -0.0054*** -0.0045*** -0.0056*** -0.0036*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Cumulative Previous Amount 
of Win 
  -0.0012*** 0.0001* -0.0012*** 0.0000 -0.0013*** -0.0000 
  (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Cumulative Previous Amount 
of Loss 
  0.0043*** 0.0006** 0.0040*** 0.0009*** 0.0041*** 0.0008** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
No. of Hot Product in the Week     0.0667*** 0.0568*** 0.1397*** 0.0086 
    (0.0063) (0.0088) (0.0115) (0.0178) 
No. of Common Product in the 
Week 
    0.0032 0.0296*** 0.0114*** 0.0432*** 
    (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0042) 
Gini Coefficient of the Week       11.9876*** -8.4364*** 
      (1.2886) (2.4491) 
90th Percentile Surplus Among 
Bidders in the Group 
      -0.0019** 0.0043*** 
      (0.0009) (0.0004) 
75th Percentile Surplus Among 
Bidders in the Group 
      0.4083*** -0.0075*** 
      (0.0443) (0.0010) 
50th Percentile Surplus Among 
Bidders in the Group 
      -0.0883*** -0.0069 
      (0.0151) (0.0053) 
Observations 6,960 1,104 6,960 1,104 6,960 1,104 6,960 1,104 
Number of bidder_id2 435 69 435 69 435 69 435 69 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 




Table 5-7 : Results of Regressions (Excluding the Grace Period within 28 Days After 23rd Sep 2010) 





































Dummy of Rule Changes -0.0313 -0.8200*** 0.3467 -1.7187** -0.0440 -0.5766*** 0.1423 -1.3525*** -0.0969 -0.6663*** 0.1684 -1.3395*** 
(0.0792) (0.1752) (0.2704) (0.7754) (0.0677) (0.1177) (0.2260) (0.4787) (0.0672) (0.1153) (0.2237) (0.4553) 
Amount of Win Last Week   0.0107*** 0.0139***   0.0029*** 0.0013***   0.0032*** 0.0008*** 
  (0.0023) (0.0047)   (0.0005) (0.0003)   (0.0005) (0.0003) 
Amount of Loss Last Week   -0.0158*** -0.0177***   -0.0071*** -0.0034***   -0.0073*** -0.0032*** 
  (0.0027) (0.0047)   (0.0011) (0.0011)   (0.0012) (0.0011) 
Cumulative Previous Amount 
of Win 
  0.0004 0.0007**   0.0009*** 0.0006***   0.0007** 0.0004*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0003)   (0.0003) (0.0001)   (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Cumulative Previous Amount 
of Loss 
  0.0092*** 0.0014   0.0020*** 0.0004   0.0033*** 0.0008 
  (0.0013) (0.0014)   (0.0006) (0.0007)   (0.0006) (0.0007) 
No. of Hot Product in the 
Week 
  0.1192*** 0.1320   0.1036*** 0.0650   0.1083*** 0.0452 
  (0.0394) (0.0932)   (0.0330) (0.0572)   (0.0326) (0.0545) 
No. of Common Product in the 
Week 
  0.0390*** 0.1128***   0.0259*** 0.0652***   0.0277*** 0.0668*** 
  (0.0069) (0.0222)   (0.0057) (0.0131)   (0.0056) (0.0127) 
Gini Coefficient of the Week   5.2063 17.0903   5.7050 6.2339   6.2509 6.4881 
  (6.1188) (13.2905)   (5.0889) (8.3559)   (5.0298) (8.0132) 
90th Percentile Surplus 
Among Bidders in the Group 
  -0.0004 0.0021   -0.0009 0.0007   -0.0008 0.0020 
  (0.0019) (0.0041)   (0.0016) (0.0024)   (0.0016) (0.0023) 
75th Percentile Surplus 
Among Bidders in the Group 
  0.4225*** -0.0030   0.3388*** -0.0009   0.3656*** -0.0023 
  (0.0984) (0.0046)   (0.0808) (0.0029)   (0.0797) (0.0027) 
50th Percentile Surplus 
Among Bidders in the Group 
  -0.0854*** 0.0298   -0.0679*** 0.0165   -0.0714*** 0.0163 
  (0.0308) (0.0326)   (0.0256) (0.0200)   (0.0253) (0.0193) 
Constant     -2.8896*** -1.8022*** -10.4394** -10.4660 -1.4811*** -0.6148*** -9.5738* -9.3609 
    (0.0494) (0.0727) (5.2604) (8.8336) (0.0661) (0.0965) (5.1973) (8.4615) 
Observations 4,320 780 4,320 780 4,320 792 4,320 792 4,320 792 4,320 792 
Number of bidder_id2 360 65 360 65 360 66 360 66 360 66 360 66 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




5.5. Further Testing of RQ1: A FGT Metrics Method 
5.5.1. Measuring Bidder Surplus Using FGT Metrics 
Though our Gini coefficients have well demonstrated the trend of surplus distribution 
changes, there is still a gap for us to analyze the surplus changes at individual level. In 
particular, RQ 1 is at a macro level, while RQ 2 and RQ 3 are at a micro level to measure 
the effect of the rules. To fill this gap, we apply the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) 
metrics to reveal the surplus distribution from 3 perspectives: the extent of low surplus, 
the intensity of low surplus and the surplus inequality among the low-type bidders (Foster 
et al., 1984). With a predefined threshold (or cutoff), low surplus refers to bidder’s 
weekly surplus that is lower than the threshold. Low-type bidders are bidders with low 
surplus. Similarly, there are high-type bidders with surplus that is higher than the 
threshold, i.e., the high surplus. 
FGT metrics are used to measure poverty level in an economy (Foster, J., et al.  1984). 
There are three well-known FGT metrics: (1) headcount (HC) that measures the 
incidence of poverty; (2) poverty gap index (PGI) that reveals the intensity of poverty; 
and (3) squared poverty gap index (SPGI) that depicts the income inequality among the 
poor. The higher values these metrics are, the higher level of poverty there is. 
There are several reasons for applying FGT to measure surplus distribution in penny 
auction. First, it is simple, and it has the ability to tolerate negative incomes (or surplus). 
Unlike the complicated adjusted Gini formula in previous chapter, FGT has simple 
specifications and thus is easier for interpretations. Second, FGT provides diverse metrics 
in analyze poverty level, which provides better insights of the phenomenon. For example, 




in SPGI, individuals with lower surplus are given more weight in the measure. In this 
case, we would be able to consider the heterogeneity of bidders in respect of their surplus 
levels. Finally, FGT can fit very well into the context of penny auction. For example, in 
penny auction bidder’s surplus distribution is biased and different bidders are likely to 
have different surplus. Low bidder surplus is analogous to low income in 
macroeconomics (i.e. income below the poverty line), and high bidder surplus can be 
analogous to high income. With these similarities the penny auction context can be 
modeled using FGT metrics.  
5.5.2. Determining the Surplus Threshold 
To subjectively decide the surplus threshold z, we apply Probit model using probability of 
participation as dependent variable and bidder’s surplus of last week as independent 
variable. Intuitively, this surplus threshold would be better if it could satisfy two criteria. 
First, it should be positive; otherwise it contradicts the common understanding of 
“poverty line”. Second, it would better if it is of a reasonable order of magnitude. A too 
large threshold in the penny auction context is not a sound one. This is because an 
extreme small group of the bidders (5%) are winning the majority of the auctions, 
resulting in a poor surplus for the majority of bidders. Such poor surplus wouldn’t be too 
large. Therefore, if the threshold is too large it cannot be applied to all the bidders. 
We separately estimate the model both before and after the rule changes at the 38
th
 week 
of the year. Occasional bidders and frequent bidders are considered as a whole but not 
separate. This provides us with insights of how bidders’ surplus affects their participation 
behaviors. The result is depicted in Figure 5-2. This figure shows the relationship 




between bidder’s weekly surplus and the corresponding estimated participating 
probability. In general, higher surplus is related to higher probability of participation. The 
two curves intersect at the point (13.5, 0.696), which provides us a cutoff of 13.5 SGD 
per week. This cutoff is reasonable because it is located within a reasonable range, 
positive but not too large.  
As shown in Figure 5-2, bidders with surplus smaller than 13.5 SGD per week are 
stimulated by the 3 rules, as they are more likely to participate in penny auction after the 
rule changes. In contrast, if a bidder has a surplus level above 13.5 SGD per week, he is 
inclined to participate less with the 3 rules. This is probably due of the bidding 
restrictions that hamper him to obtain larger surplus, thus discouraging them to 
participate. 
As a result, we can use this threshold (i.e. 13.5 SGD per week) to define high-type 
bidders and low-type bidders, using similar method that is been widely applied in 
macroeconomics to define the rich and the poor. Bidders above this threshold seem to be 
constrained by the rules, as their participation probability is reducing after the rule change. 
These bidders, therefore, can be treated as the high-type bidders. On the other hand, 
bidders below this threshold are struggling for a better surplus, and they form the low-
type bidders. 




Besides, the result in Figure 5-2 is helpful for us to roughly estimate new bidders’ 
bidding intentions
6
. As can be seen, bidders with zero-surplus have increased 
probabilities of participation. Specifically, when surplus equals to zero, the associated 
probability increases by 1 percent and reaches 0.69. Though it is not a significant (and 
large) increase, it is consistent with our prediction. Our intention to introduce the three 
rules is to retain the majority of bidders. This intention is, substantially, to obtain a higher 
likelihood of bidder’s participating. The implication of this result is important. Without 
the help of additional research methodology such as survey, we managed to measure 
potential entrants’ likelihood to participate in penny auction.  
 
 
Figure 5-2 : Probability of Participation Using Probit Model 
 
                                                             
6 New bidders, in this case, are those bidders who have zero surpluses. This is reasonable in the context of 
penny auction due to the effect of bidding fee. As long as a bidder places a bid, one token will be deducted 





















Bidder Surplus (SGD) 
Before 23rd Sep 
After 23rd Sep 




5.5.3. Results of FGT Estimations 
To apply FGT, the only obstacle is how to define the level of low surplus (i.e. the poverty 
line). Instead of determining it intuitively, we use Probit model to come out with the 
exact value of this threshold. As a consequence, we determine the threshold as 13.5 SGD. 
That is, a bidder with weekly surplus larger than 13.5 SGD is treated as high-type bidder 
(or, the rich), and low-type bidders are those who obtain weekly surplus lower than 13.5 
SGD (including negative surplus). 
The results of the 3 FGT metrics are shown in Figure 5-3 to Figure 5-5. There are 
consistent conclusions which suggest that the majority of bidders have better surplus after 
the 3 rules were introduced. Take Figure 5-3, the average headcount ratio is lower after 
the rule implementation (at the 38
th
 week). Besides, after a significant drop between the 
40
th
 week and the 42
nd
 week, the headcount ratio is approaching towards a stable and low 
level. 
As depicted in Figure 5-4 and Figure 5-5, there are significant drops of either PGI or 
SPGI at the 39
th
 week, suggesting that the 3 rules are indeed mitigating the level of low 
surplus among the low-type bidders. In both figures, the values of indices are temporally 
higher between the 35
th
 week and the 38
th
 week. That suggests there is larger proportion 
of low-type bidders during this period. This is consistent with the fact that a small group 
of bidders are winning most of the auctions. 
Furthermore, we conduct regressions on the three FGT metrics using the rule dummy as 
the independent variable. As can be seen in Table 5-8, the coefficient of the rule dummy, 
though not significant, suggests negative effects of the three rules. That means after the 




rule changes the FGT metrics are reduced, though the reductions are not significant. We 
can confirm such reduction from Figure 5-3 to Figure 5-5. 
 
Figure 5-3 : Headcount of PennyLeader 
 
 
























Figure 5-5 : Squared Poverty Gap Index (SPGI) of PennyLeader 
 
Table 5-8 : Regression on FGT Metrics 
 8 Weeks’ Windows 4 Weeks’ Window 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (6) 
 
Headcount PGI SPGI Headcount PGI SPGI 


























Observations 16 16 16 8 8 8 
R-squared 0.5953 0.0246 0.0083 0.2895 0.0543 0.0216 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To obtain a more insightful view of how the values of the poverty line change across 
time, we depict Figure 5-6 that shows the weekly value of the poverty cutoff from week 
39 to week 46. Note that we need two curves, both before rule change and after rule 
change, to generate the intersect point that determines the poverty line. Hence, we vary 












As can be seen, from the first week after the rule change, the values of the cutoff point 
rise as time increases. For instance, at week 39 the cutoff point is -42.5. This indicates 
that as long as a bidder have weekly surplus larger than -42.5 SGD, he can be counted as 
above the surplus standard. Hence, it is suggested that the majority of bidders are 
experiencing extremely negative surplus at that week. As time increases, the value of the 
poverty cutoff increases as well. Somewhere between the 43
rd
 week and the 44
th
 week, it 
reaches a positive value. After 8 weeks, at the 46
th
 week, it reaches 13.5. As the value of 
the cutoff represents the “living standard” of bidders, it is obvious that bidders are 
improving in respect of their weekly surplus. Therefore, it supports our purpose of 
designing the 3 rules that they can mitigate the skewed surplus distribution. 
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5.6. Analysis of Rule Effects across Time 
In previous chapters, it is tested that the rule dummy significantly affects the changes of 
bidder’s bidding behaviors and participating behaviors. At this step, the rule dummy is 
replaced by the time trend variables to gain a more insightful view of the rule effects. 
That is, we include time dummies indicating each of the weeks, in order to check how 
bidders’ participations are changing across time. Note that we don’t include website 
specific control variables such as number of hot/common products and the several 
percentile surpluses. This is because these control variables are on a weekly basis and 
they will be omitted when including the week dummies. The results of the checks are 
shown in Table 5-9, where the dummy of the 47
th
 week is omitted by the regression 
models. 
The coefficient of a time dummy reveals the changes of dependent variables in the 
specific week. The larger the coefficient is, the more influential the three rules are at that 
specific time. As can be seen in Column (a.1), coefficients of time dummies rise from the 
first week (i.e. the 30
th
 week) and experience the peak in the 38
th
 week, which is the week 
of rule changes. Besides, by comparing the coefficient before and after the rule change in 
the 38
th
 week, on average the coefficients after the rule changes are larger than those of 
before. This implies that, occasional bidders increase their number of bids more after the 
rule changes than before the rule changes. After controlling factors such as their surplus 
history, the results of Column (a.1) suggest that the three rules have positive effects on 
stimulating bidder’s number of bids.  




As for results of frequent bidders in Column (a.2), the coefficient of time dummies are 
significantly higher before the rule changes and they are declining dramatically within 
several weeks after the 38
th
 week. Such a trend implies a significant negative effect of the 
rules on frequent bidders’ bid numbers. Therefore, using a Negative Binomial model, we 
show consistent results with the Poisson regression of bid number in Model 3. 
Regarding the number of auctions joined, the results are shown in Column (b). Similarly, 
by comparing the values of the time dummy coefficients, occasional bidders are most 
positively influenced after the 38
th
 week, while frequent bidders reduce their number of 
participations after the rule changes. Hence, the robustness check confirms the previous 
results of participation number in Model 3 as well. 
Furthermore, the time dummy coefficients in Table 5-9 also suggest a diminishing effect 
of the rules in the long term. Though the coefficients are larger for occasional bidders 
afterward, these values are reducing and become insignificant once again. This 
observation, however, is consistent with our previous results of the Gini coefficient in 
Figure 5-1. Such diminishing effect may be explained by the reality that occasional 
bidders are also constrained by the three bidding restrictions. For example, they may be 
prohibited to bid for the same item more than once, even if they really need the same item 
again. Hence, an unpleasant feeling may be aroused and drive the bidders to participate 








Table 5-9 : Robustness Check of Model 3 Using Week Dummies 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variables 
(a) No. of Bids Placed  
(Negative Binomial) 


























































































































































































Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,126 1,422 9,126 1,422 
Number of bidders 507 79 507 79 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




6. Discussion and Implications 
6.1. Cause of Aggressive Bidding in Penny Auction: Addiction 
Penny auction combines features of both auctions and gambling. On the one hand, the 
amount of bids (i.e. tokens) is not monotonically related to the probability of winning the 
auction, which is similar to lotteries. For instance, a bidder who has placed a lot of bids 
may still be outbid by others, as long as other bidders have sufficient tokens and 
willingness to bid. It is also possible that a bidder places only a few tokens but still wins 
the auction, provided that none of the others are willing to bid. Therefore, number of 
tokens does not guarantee winning in penny auction. From this perspective a penny 
auction is like a gamble or a lottery. On the other hand, unlike lottery winning probability 
in penny auction is not exogenously determined because it is influenced by factors such 
as number of participants. Hence, a penny auction is not a pure random game as 
gambling. Raviv (2009) proposed the concept of “gambling auction”, which is an early 
format of penny auction. 
According to Narayanan and Manchanda (2006) who study gambling and gaming 
industry in the United States, there are evidences showing that gambling addiction exists 
in casino gambling. Given the similar mechanism as gambling, it is reasonable to argue 
that there exist gambling addiction behaviors in penny auction. In this context, gambling 
addiction is defined as a positive correlation between bidder’s previous number of bids 
and bidder’s current number of bids, as suggested by Narayanan and Manchanda (2006). 
Therefore, an addicted bidder will keep bidding more and more over time. 




However, the new rules, especially rule 1 that stipulates a maximum of 8 auctions won 
within 28 days, will reduce bidder’s addiction for two reasons. If a bidder has already 
won the maximum number of auctions, he will not be able to join any auction in 
following days, mitigating his mania of the auctions. On the other hand, if the maximum 
allowance has yet been reached, a bidder may become more hesitative about whether to 
join the next auction or not, because that will reduce his ability of participating in future 
auctions. In both cases, bidder’s level of addiction to the game will reduce. 
6.1.1. A Difference-in-Differences Method 
We use difference-in-differences method to model the effects of the 3 rules on bidder 
addiction. We compare number of bids placed by a bidder in normal penny auction with 
those in free auctions. Free auction is a special type of penny auction in which there is no 
bidding fee. It is similar, but not exactly same as traditional eBay auction in the sense that 
it retains other features of penny auction, such as soft-closing ending and zero starting 
prices. Free auctions are of interests because the format of free auction is consistent with 
other widely applied auctions, such as those auctions on eBay or Amazon, in which there 
is no bidding cost. As mentioned above, bidder’s addiction reflects on a positive 
relationship between previous number of bids and current number of bids, and the rule 
changes may reduce such relationship as suggested by our hypothesis. This study applies 
the difference-in-differences approach as a statistical methodology to address this 
research question.  
Identifying effects of the rules requires more than simply comparing the coefficient of a 
variable before the rule changed with its counterpart estimated after the rule changed. 




This is because there are many other factors that may have been changed across time. For 
example, there will be new bidders to register on the penny auction website, and thus the 
user pool is changing. Besides, the penny auction website’s reputation may be growing 
over time, which may generate different effects on bidders. These latent changes may 
cause an estimation bias and need to be taken into account. Difference-in-differences 
approach has been applied to address this issue in many other contexts (Gruber and 
Poterba, 1994; Triest, 1998). For instance, Eissa (1995) addressed the effect of tax code 
change on the labor supply of married woman by comparing two different groups of 
woman samples. Furthermore, culture-specific advertising strategy on women’s magazine 
was studied by Dallmann (2001), basing on the comparison of general-interest magazine.  
The goal of this difference-in-differences model is to verify the existence of addiction 
behaviors and to identify the net effects of rule changes in normal auctions. Therefore, it 
is necessary to control any effects from other factors beyond the rule changes. Such 
control is done by making a comparison with free auctions. As discussed previously, free 
auctions include no bidding cost. In free auctions, bidder’s behaviors are less affected by 
the introduction of the 3 rules, mainly due to the absence of bidding fee. Hence, free 
auctions are more stable under the rule change and can be used as the baseline. Therefore, 
a comparison of normal penny auction and free auction can rule out other affects
7
. 
In this study, the difference-in-differences approach is used within a panel regression 
model. Narayanan and Manchanda (2008) developed an auction model using 
                                                             
7 Technically, both normal auctions and free auctions are affected by other factors beyond the rules. By 
comparing the changes of free auctions with the changes of normal auctions, we can eliminate the effects of 
other factors beyond the rules. 




disaggregated level data to measure gamblers’ level of addiction. In their study, 
Narayanan and Manchanda (2008) defined addiction as a positive relationship between 
previous amount of bet and current bet decision. This study develops a similar reduced-
form model and focuses on bidder’s number of bids. Combining with the difference-in-
differences approach, specification of model 1 is given as 
                                                           
Where t denotes the time and i denotes bidder,          is the number of bids placed by 
bidder I at time t-1,       is the number of bids placed by bidder i at time t,          is 
the number of bids placed previously,       is a dummy variable indicating whether it is 
after the rule changed or not,        , similarly, is a dummy variable of free auction,     
is an unobservable factor that affects the bid amount. 
There are two focuses in this model. First, the coefficient of          that indicates the 
level of bidder addiction, which is suggested by previous literatures. The other focus is 
the interaction effect of       and        , which reveals the effect of rule changes. The 
results of the model are shown in Table 6-1. 
Recall that if we are going to analyze the effect of rules on addiction to penny auction, we 
need firstly to confirm the existence of addiction. As can be seen from Table 6-1, number 
of previous number of bids is significantly related with the dependent variable, number of 
current number of bids. This suggests that a bidder will escalate his commitments in 
penny auction gradually. This suggests a symptom of addiction based on definition of 
addiction. Technically, the result suggests an additional bid placed previously will 
increase 1.15 bids (i.e. exp(0.138)) at current auction. Therefore, we confirm the 
existence of addiction behaviors in penny auction. 





Table 6-1 : Result of Difference-in-Differences Model 
Independent Variables All Obs 



















Dummy of Normal Auction -0.895*** 
(0.295) 
    
Dummy of Rule change -1.300*** 
(0.237) 
    
Normal * Rule 2.456*** 
(0.415) 











Observations 56,076 17,702 20,067 9,317 8,990 
Number of bidder_id2 4,455 1,642 2,044 2,202 1,602 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The two dummy variables of rule changes and normal auction and their interaction term 
              are significant as shown in Table 6-1. In difference-in-differences 
approach, the coefficient of the interaction term is of interests because it reveals how the 
rule changes affect free auctions, eliminating other unobserved effects from other factors. 
As we can see, the coefficient of the interaction term is significantly positive. It is 
interpreted in this way: comparing with before the rule changes, in normal auctions 
bidder’s number of bids is increased by 11.66 (i.e. exp(2.456)) after the rule changes. In 
other words, bidder’s level of participation increases after introducing the rules.  





6.2.1. Theoretical Implications 
Penny auction is a relatively new phenomenon and auction theorists are still studying its 
theoretical properties. Different from the conventional eBay auction, penny auctions 
seem to be more complicated to be solved by game theory. The current frontier of the 
modeling literature can only solve a model with restrictive assumptions (Platt et al. 2010; 
Mittal 2010; Byers et al. 2010; Hinnosaar 2010). The equilibria derived in those 
theoretical papers are mixed-strategy equilibrium, which means a bidder will bid at each 
price following a probability distribution so that the other bidders will feel indifferent 
between bidding or not at any price. Since they feel indifferent between bidding or not, 
they will adopt the same probability distribution for bidding at each price. This kind of 
equilibrium could be thought-provoking to applied game theorists but is unrealistic and is 
difficult to convince executives its practical value. As a result, one weakness of our study 
is the tie to theoretical foundation because not many theoretical results that we can 
borrow for empirical testing in this new area. 
At the same time, our exploratory empirical study does shed light on this novel e-
business phenomenon. Auction models in the literature do not provide a complete 
analysis about the interaction and competition among bidders across auctions on the same 
auction site. Our results show the importance of protecting the interests of most bidders 
to maintain a reasonable distribution of surplus, even at the cost of restricting the bidding 
of those “very loyal bidders” (frequent bidders). At first sight, restricting frequent bidders’ 
participation may look like “slaughtering cash cows”. However, in the penny auctions 




context, frequent bidders cause negative externality to other bidders. Bidding restrictions 
could benefit more customers so that they will bid more, leading to higher profitability to 
the auction provider in the long run. 
6.2.2. Practical Implications 
The famous Pareto Rule suggests that 20% of the customers may typically generate 80% 
of the sales or profits of any company. However, we find that this is not the case for the 
penny auction business because of its innovative tweak in the auction rules. We find that 
indeed few customers won most of the auctions. However, those winners may create loss 
to a penny auction provider whereas all other bidders contribute to the revenue and 
profits to the penny auction provider. Across auctions, if only a small group of bidders 
win most auctions, it is natural to infer that the rest of bidders will gradually turn away 
from the penny auctions. Without retaining a large number of bidders, any type of 
auctions may fail miserably in the long run. Our study contributes to the practice in 
providing new evidence that restricting frequent bidders may indeed encourage the rest of 
bidders to bid more and therefore these three rules could be a novel business strategy for 
customer retention in the penny auction context.  
Second, penny auctioneers should adjust their product assortment strategies by 
considering from bidders’ perspectives. Though more bidders would benefit the website 
in the short run, if the number of products remains the same, bidders may be threatened 
by the growing number of competitors in each auction, ending losing more tokens. Over 
the long run, the effect of customer acquisition may be traded-off. Therefore, auctioneers 
should design suitable product offerings as the retention strategy to cater to this issue. 




Besides, it is necessary to maintain an optimal frequency or probability of winning for 
each customer, to maintain a reasonable level of customer retention rate. With higher 
opportunities of winning, bidders are motivated to participate more. It implies a similar 
incentive mechanism as promotion in traditional marketing. That is, if given any 
additional benefit, customers are more willing to involve in the websites. 





In this study, we analyze one of the emerging online auction formats -- penny auction. 
We firstly provide detailed discussions on penny auction and each of its unique features 
like bidding fee, bidding increment and extendable countdown timer. Given that the 
winner of a penny auction can derive large amount of positive surplus, it is of the penny 
auctioneers’ interests to maintain a more equalized surplus distribution. This is because if 
the surplus distribution is skewed for aggressive bidders and against occasional bidders, 
the occasional bidders may leave the website and thus there generates a bidder retention 
issue for auctioneers.  
Focusing on this issue, we design 3 auction bidding rules with the intention to restrict 
aggressive bidders’ behaviors and adjust the surplus distribution. We conduct a field 
experiment on a penny auction website to empirically analyze the effects of bidding 
restrictions on customer retention and surplus distribution. We provide evidence that 
there is skewed surplus distribution on the penny auction website before the 
implementation of the restrictions. Then we use three empirical models to analyze the 
impacts of restrictions. Empirical results show that the rules can significantly equalize 
customer surplus and mitigate the issue that frequent bidders win most of the auctions. 
With a more equalized surplus distribution, occasional bidders are shown to be more 
probable to bid again. Besides, they are more likely to place more bids in the auctions 
they participated. Additional tests like FGT metrics are used to verify our findings. 
Finally, we discuss the possible cause of the aggressive bidding behaviors in penny 




auction. It is argued that there exist addiction behaviors in penny auction, and such 
addiction behaviors will probably lead to aggressiveness. 
This study is not without limitations, which also provide opportunities for future research. 
First, our research design is a quasi-experiment. It would be perfect if researchers can 
conduct a natural experiment with randomly assigned bidders. Obviously, it is difficult to 
find any e-commerce company to conduct this kind of experiment at the risk of offending 
their customers. With a randomly assignment experiment, we can better control for 
unobservable covariates, particularly those relate to different time points during the 
sample period. Also, by an (quasi-)experiment with more treatment groups, we may be 
able to find out the profit-maximizing rules similar to our three rules. For example, we 
can find the optimal restriction on the numbers of auction in our Rule 1. A related 
research direction is to study the impacts of 3 rules separately. In addition, with a better 
experimental design in the future, we would be able to compare a control group where 
bidders are not constrainted by any rules, and a treatment group where bidders are 
restrcited by our rules. In this way we can provide more convincing results if we 
can observe an higher participation and bidder retention rate in the treatment 
group. 
Second, we focus on analyzing the impacts on the aggregated consumer behaviors. It 
could be a fruitful and important research direction to investigate the impacts of 3 rules 
on the bidding strategies of bidders and the profitability associated with each bidder. 
Third, implicitly, we conceptually assume three rules increase occasional bidders’ surplus 
and next, because of the increased consumer surplus, occasional bidders will bid more in 
penny auctions. But, empirically, we only show that three rules correlate with better 




customer retention and more participation. Logically, it could be due to other 
(psychological) effects. For example, it could be the aversion of unfairness is driven the 
results, not just the value of consumer surplus. It could also be the reputation of the penny 
auction site has been improved because of the three rules. We need other rigorous 
empirical research design to study these issues separately. 
Fourth, “learning” is generally a popular topic in the academic literature across 
disciplines. We could use our dataset to study the learning of bidding strategies in the 
penny auctions context.  
Firth, with our dataset, we can study several interesting bounded rational behaviors in the 
penny auction setting. For example, we can carefully examine the sunk costs effects in 
auctions. Theoretically, a bidding decision should not be related to how many tokens 
have been spent in the same auction, not to mention tokens spent in other auctions in the 
same day. But, we may be able to empirically verify the impacts of sunk costs in this 
setting. 
Finally, the gambling analogy where we argued there are addiction behaviors in penny 
auctions is relatively weak and is pending for more research. The definition of addiction 
in our context is adopted from Narayanan and Manchanda (2008) who studied casino 
gambling. Visiting a casino is more costly in reality than on Internet, and thus gambling 
addition seems to more reasonably reflect on number of visits under casino gambling 
than under penny auction. However, in fact the cost of visiting PennyLeader is not trivial. 
According to analysis the world’s leading Web information company Alexa.com, more 
users visit PennyLeader from their workplaces than from their homes. With the existence 
of monitoring in workplaces, visiting an entertainment website like PennyLeader is not 




cost-free. Therefore, if a working person increases his participation in penny auction, he 
is showing a certain symptom of addition to penny auction. This provides interesting 
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Appendix A: Process of PennyLeader 
This appendix graphically shows the interface of PennyLeader and the key changes 
during the auction process. Figure A-1 shows the basic interface of the auction. As can be 
seen, the left part contains product images and basic product information. The right part 
has the bid history window that contains bid price, bidder’s name and bid type. Each time 
a bidder places a bid the right window will be updated. The middle part contains bid price 
(i.e. current item price), current winner (e.g. AlexJame in the figure), countdown timer, 
the bid button, and basic statistics of price information (e.g. retail price, discount price). 
Figure A-2 shows the changes of penny auction when there is a new bid. The bid history 
window in the right hand side has one more record that indicates the latest bidder’s 
information. The bid price is increased by 15 cents (i.e. bidding increment). The timer is 
reset to 20 seconds. Subtly one token that cost 75 cents is consumed from the latest 
bidder’s account. Figure A-3 shows the ended auction. As can be seen, the item is sold at 
a deep-discounted price. The winner gets the item at only 8.7 SGD.  
 




Figure A-1 : PennyLeader Interface (Initial) 
 
 
Figure A-2 : PennyLeader Interface (After a new bid is placed) 
 




Figure A-3 : PennyLeader Interface (When the auction ended) 
 
